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Cloudy Privacy Protections: Why the
Stored Communications Act Fails to
Protect the Privacy of
Communications Stored in the Cloud
ABSTRACT
The advent of new communications technologies has generated
debate over the applicability of the Fourth Amendment's warrant
requirement to communications sent through, and stored in,
technologies not anticipated by the Framers. In 1986, Congress
responded to perceived gaps in the protections of the warrant
requirement as applied to newer technologies, such as email, by
passing the Stored Communications Act (SCA). As originally enacted,
the SCA attempted to balance the interests of law enforcement against
individual privacy rights by dictating the mechanisms by which the
government could compel a particular service provider to disclose
communications stored on behalf of its customers. However,
technological advances since 1986-especially the advent of cloud
computing-have rendered the SCA unworkable and unpredictable.
This Note examines how the SCA's compelled disclosure
provisions apply to cloud computing services. It begins by discussing
the historical precedents for the SCA and its basic provisions. It then
demonstrates the complexity of the SCA and shows that cloud
computing services may lie beyond the scope of the Act. This Note
concludes by examining the current debate over the SCA and
recommending that Congress require the government to obtain a
warrant to compel service providers to disclose communications stored
in the cloud.
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While millions of people rely each and every day on cloud-based
computing services, such as Gmail and Facebook, cloud computing
probably seems esoteric to laymen. Microsoft Corporation's recent
slate of television commercials exploits the technology's mystique to
bring "cloud computing" into users' lexicons, juxtaposing superhero-
esque comedy with seemingly abstruse cloud computing. 2 In one
commercial, a woman sits at an airport with her male companion. 3
She appears distraught over the news that her flight is delayed.4 To
the cue of superhero music, her male companion has an epiphany and
saves the day by declaring, "to the cloud!"5 Despite the woman's
newfound serenity, however, she will face limited privacy protections
when she goes "to the cloud."6
1. DIGITAL DUE PROCESS, COMMENTS ON INFORMATION PRIVACY AND INNOVATION IN
THE INTERNET ECONOMY 5 (June 14, 2010), available at http://www.digitaldueprocess.
org/files/NTIANOI 061410.pdf.





6. See infra notes 168-190 and accompanying text.
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Microsoft's commercials paint cloud computing as a more
efficient model for end-users to "create and share. Anywhere."7
However, the advertisements do not define the "cloud" or warn
customers of the privacy implications of storing data there.8 This Note
explores the privacy concerns users face when transmitting and
storing communications in the cloud. Additionally, it seeks to
determine when the government may compel cloud service providers
to disclose the communications they maintain on behalf of end-users.
To ensure the privacy of communications transmitted and
stored electronically via new technologies-except when the
government followed proper judicial procedures-Congress enacted
the Stored Communications Act (SCA) as part of the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (ECPA).9 The SCA provides a
web of "Fourth Amendment-like privacy protections by statute,
regulating the relationship between government investigators and
[Internet] service providers (ISPs) in possession of users' private
information."10 When Congress enacted the SCA in 1986-four years
before the introduction of the World Wide Web in 1990, and eight
years before the first web browser in 199411-it did not foresee the
advent of cloud computing. 12
The recent proliferation of cloud computing has generated
considerable uncertainty regarding the applicability of the SCA's
privacy protections to communications stored in the cloud.13 The
technology industry is increasingly turning away from the personal
computing model-in which users access, store, and manage their
data and processing locally on their own PCs-and toward cloud
computingl 4-in which users go online to access and manage their
7. WindowsVideos, supra note 2.
8. See id.
9. Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.).
10. Orin S. Kerr, A User's Guide to the Stored Communication Act, and a Legislator's
Guide to Amending It, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1208, 1212 (2004).
11. TIM BERNERS-LEE WITH MARK FISCHETTI, WEAVING THE WEB: THE ORIGINAL
DESIGN AND ULTIMATE DESTINY OF THE WORLD WIDE WEB 69 (1999); NICHOLAS CARR, THE BIG
SWITCH: REWIRING THE WORLD, FROM EDISON TO GOOGLE 17 (2008).
12. ECPA Reform and the Revolution in Cloud Computing: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary,
111th Cong. 2 (2010) [hereinafter September 23 Hearing] (statement of Marc J. Zwillinger,
Partner, Zwillinger Genetski LLP) (stating the SCA was based on the assumption that users
download their emails to their computers, whereas now emails typically remain on the server
after being read by the recipient).
13. See infra notes 168-190 and accompanying text.
14. Christopher Soghoian, Caught in the Cloud: Privacy, Encryption, and Government
Back Doors in the Web 2.0 Era, 8 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 362-63, 364 (2010).
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data stored for them on remote servers.15 As of September 2008, 69
percent of Americans reported having accessed the cloud at least once,
either by storing data online or by using web-based software
applications.' 6  Additionally, a survey conducted in 2010 of 895
technology insiders and critics found that 71 percent of respondents
believed most people will employ cloud-computing technologies for
work by 2020.17 Only 27 percent of respondents thought that the most
important applications would continue to run on PC operating
systems.'8 Unfortunately, the SCA's failure to adequately address
privacy issues presented by technologies not anticipated by Congress
will likely become more problematic as users increasingly employ
cloud computing services.19
This Note argues that the SCA may not protect cloud-
computing technologies and proposes that Congress amend the Act to
rectify this omission. Part I discusses the historical background and
basic provisions of the SCA. Part II demonstrates that the SCA, and
current interpretations of it by the courts, have created a confusing set
of privacy protections, and that the Act's framework may not protect
communications stored in the cloud. Part III discusses the current
debate and suggestions for reform, and proposes that Congress amend
the SCA to ensure that communications stored in the cloud are subject
to a warrant requirement, regardless of the characterization of the
service or the duration of storage.
I. CLOUD COMPUTING AND THE NEED FOR PROTECTION
A. What is Cloud Computing?
The definition of "cloud computing" is the subject of
considerable debate. 20  The National Institute of Standards &
15. Cloud Computing, ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INFO. CENTER, http://epic.org/privacy/
cloudcomputing/#introduction (last visited Feb. 19, 2011).
16. JANNA QUITNEY ANDERSON & LEE RAINE, THE FUTURE OF CLOUD COMPUTING 8
(2010), available at http://www.elon.edu/docs/e-web/predictions/expertsurveys/2010survey/PIP
FutureofInternet 2010_cloud.pdf.
17. Id. at 2.
18. Id.
19. See DIGITAL DUE PROCESS, supra note 1, at 5-6 (explaining that the SCA [ECPA]
has not kept up with advances in technology and arguing that the lack of robust privacy
protection for data stored in the cloud does not accord with the central role technology plays in
communications); see also ROBERT GELLMAN, PRIVACY IN THE CLOUDS: RISKS TO PRIVACY AND
CONFIDENTIALITY FROM CLOUD COMPUTING 6 (2009), available at http://www.world
privacyforum.org/pdflWPFCloud PrivacyReport.pdf ("While storage of user data on remote
servers is not a new activity, the current emphasis on and expansion of cloud computing
warrants a more careful look at the privacy and confidentiality consequences.").
20. Soghoian, supra note 14, at 364.
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Technology (NIST) defines cloud computing as a "model for enabling
convenient, on-demand network access to a shared pool of configurable
computing resources (e.g., networks, servers, storage, applications,
and services) that can be rapidly provisioned and released with
minimal management effort or service provider interaction."2 1
Essentially, users store or share their information on the Internet and
third-party providers maintain that information on remote servers
owned or operated by the provider. 22 Users do not own the technology;
instead, they rent time or space from the cloud provider. 23 The "cloud"
refers to the image depicted on computer network diagrams, which
depict the Internet as a "vast cloud at the top of a network chain."24
The emergence of cloud computing reflects a paradigm shift
from the mainframe and personal computing models of previous
decades. 25 Initially, the mainframe computing model allowed users to
"operate on slices of a central server's time and resources." 26 In the
mainframe era, companies backed by Wall Street purchased
mainframes and then sold computer time to other firms.27 Companies
that did not purchase their own mainframes would lease time from
the owner and effectively time-shared the computer with other
businesses. 28  Mainframe computers had several limitations; for
example, only experts operated the enormous machines, which filled
entire floors of buildings.29 Mainframe computing gave way to the
personal computing model, which returned to the user physical control
over his data.30 The PC paradigm required users to upgrade their own
hardware if they ran out of storage space or needed more computing
21. Peter Mell & Tim Grance, The NIST Definition of Cloud Computing, NIST.GOV (Oct.
7, 2009), http://csre.nist.gov/groups/SNS/cloud-computing (follow "NIST Definition of Cloud
Computing v15" hyperlink).
22. Gellman, supra note 19, at 4.
23. Cloud Computing, ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INFO. CENTER, http://epic.org/privacy/
cloudcomputing/#introduction (last visited Jan. 21, 2011).
24. Id.
25. Offline (local) computing and cloud computing are not mutually exclusive, as users
today store data locally as well as in the cloud. See R. Bruce Wells, Comment, The Fog of Cloud
Computing: Fourth Amendment Issues Raised by the Blurring of Online and Offline Content, 12
U. PA. J. CONST. L. 223, 233 (2009) (analyzing applications "blurring" the distinction between
offline and online content, like Google's Chrome web browser, enabling a user to "create" a
desktop version of an online application).
26. Soghoian, supra notel4, at 362.
27. PAUL E. CERUZZI, A HISTORY OF MODERN COMPUTING 210 (2d ed. 2003). An early
mainframe complex, IBM 7094, could be purchased for $1.6 million, or leased for $30,000 a
month. Id. at 74.
28. Id. at 200.
29. M. Scott Boone, What Ifs and Other Alternative Intellectual Property and Cyberlaw
Story: The Past, Present, and Future of Computing and its Impact on Digital Rights
Management, 2008 MICH. ST. L. REV. 413, 416-17.
30. Id.
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power. 31 In contrast to the PC model, cloud computing leverages
economies of scale:
In the cloud, everyday processes and information that are typically run and stored on
local computers--email, documents, calendars-can be accessed securely anytime,
anywhere, and with any device through an Internet connection. Rather than invest in
expensive and specialized IT equipment and personnel, customers can rely on the scale
and security offered by the cloud providers to access data anywhere Internet access is
available. 3 2
Businesses have shifted from local to cloud computing to
capture a variety of efficiencies, which they can then pass on to end-
users. 33 First, businesses entrusting customer and other data to cloud
service providers benefit from the providers' ability to aggregate large
volumes of data electronically, 34 which enables targeted advertising to
customers. 35 Second, businesses storing information in the cloud reap
cost savings, because they need not invest in information-technology
(IT) infrastructure, 36 and can instead "customize and rapidly scale
their IT system for their particular needs."37 Cloud computing allows
businesses to buy only the services they want, and offers the flexibility
to set and reset their computing capacities within seconds.38 These
attributes of cloud computing lower market barriers, and help
stimulate innovation among developers and small businesses. 39
Third, cloud services enable businesses and other users to
access their data "anytime, anywhere," through the Internet. 40
Fourth, cloud computing services are typically free for the user or at
least less expensive than local computing services, 41 and the costs, if
31. Id. at 363.
32. September 23 Hearing, supra note 12, at 20-21 (statement of Richard Salgado, Sr.
Counsel, Law Enforcement and Information Security, Google, Inc.).
33. See generally id. (discussing the various efficiencies cloud computing affords).
34. Id. at 26 (statement of Kevin Werbach, Associate Professor of Legal Studies &
Business Ethics, University of Pennsylvania).
35. Soghoian, supra notel4, at 364.
36. September 23 Hearing, supra note 12, at 47 (statement of David Schellhase,
Executive Vice President and General Counsel, Salesforce.com).
37. Id. at 29 (statement of Michael Hintze, Associate General Counsel, Microsoft
Corporation).
38. Id. at 29-30 (statement of Michael Hintze, Associate General Counsel, Microsoft
Corporation); see also id. at 14 (statement of Edward W. Felten, Professor of Computer Science
and Public Affairs, Princeton University) ("[I]f the start-up's business grows rapidly and it needs
to expand its computing capacity dramatically to handle a flood of new customers, this is easily
done in the cloud, by simply increasing the number of servers the start-up is renting from the
provider.").
39. Id. at 30 (statement of Michael Hintze, Associate General Counsel, Microsoft
Corporation).
40. Id. at 48 (statement of David Schellhase, Executive Vice President and General
Counsel, Salesforce.com).
41. Soghoian, supra notel4, at 366.
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any, are often more predictable. 42 Finally, cloud computing providers
regularly back up users' files and store them on multiple servers,
thereby protecting users from losing data when their hardware fails.43
While cloud computing capitalizes on various efficiencies, it
also create "dependency," because users must rely on their service
providers to maintain and protect their data. 44 Some businesses,
therefore, may want to maintain data in-house rather than outsource
their computer storage and processing services. Furthermore, once a
user shifts to the cloud for his data storage and processing, return to
the PC model may be too onerous. 45 Finally, users must depend on the
telecommunications infrastructure that transmits their data to and
from the cloud.46 Despite these limitations, cloud computing may
present a more efficient model of computing for some businesses and
end-users.47
B. Historical Protection of Fourth Amendment Privacy Rights
1. Fourth Amendment
The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides that,
"[tihe right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause ... ." 4 8
New technologies like cloud computing have stimulated vigorous
debate over the extent to which the Fourth Amendment protects
individual privacy covers technologies not contemplated by its
Framers. 49
Katz v. United States began the Supreme Court's Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence as applied to electronic surveillance.50 In
Katz, the government attached an electronic listening device to a
public telephone booth and heard the defendant's conversation
without obtaining a warrant.51 The Court held that because the
government "violated the privacy upon which [the defendant]
42. September 23 Hearing, supra note 12, at 47 (statement of David Schellhase,
Executive Vice President and General Counsel, Salesforce.com).
43. Soghoian, supra notel4, at 366.
44. Cloud Computing, supra note 23.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. See supra text accompanying notes 32-43.
48. U.S. CONsT. amend. IV.
49. See infra text accompanying notes 72-85.
50. See Susan Freiwald, First Principles of Communications Privacy, 2007 STAN. TECH.
L. REV. 3, 19 (noting that courts have used the reasonable expectation of privacy test since Katz).
51. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1976).
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justifiably relied,"5 2 the warrantless electronic surveillance infringed
the defendant's Fourth Amendment rights. 53 The Court noted that the
"Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a person
knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not
a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. But what he seeks to
preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be
constitutionally protected."54
Building on Katz, Minnesota v. Carter expounded on the test
for determining whether an individual may claim Fourth Amendment
protection.55 To raise a Fourth Amendment claim, an individual must
establish both a subjective and an objective expectation of privacy in
the place searched. 56 In other words, a defendant must demonstrate
not only that he personally expected privacy in the place searched, but
that a reasonable person would too.5 7 An objectively reasonable
expectation is "one that has 'a source outside of the Fourth
Amendment, either by reference to concepts of real or personal
property law or to understandings that are recognized and permitted
by society."'5 8  Though the standard appears sufficient, one
commentator argues that the Court's Fourth Amendment decisions in
the wake of Katz are "conceptually bankrupt," because neither positive
law nor societal understandings justify the Court's decisions.59
Further, the Supreme Court has increasingly narrowed the scope of
the Amendment's protections to such an extent that if an activity can
"conceivably" be seen through lawful means, the individual cannot
have a reasonable expectation of privacy in that activity.60
52. Id. at 353.
53. Id. at 359.
54. Id. at 351 (footnotes omitted). Katz overturned Olmstead v. United States, in which
the Court held that the Fourth Amendment protects persons or things against search and
seizure, and therefore telephone wiretapping could not violate the Fourth Amendment. See
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928).
55. Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 88 (1998).
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. (quoting Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143-44 (1978)).
59. Christopher Slobogin, Proportionality, Privacy, and Public Opinion: A Reply to Kerr
and Swire, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1588, 1591-92 (2010).
60. Id. at 1591. For example, in California v. Ciraolo, the Supreme Court held that
officers did not conduct a "search" when they rode in an airplane to view a backyard, because any
member of the public would have the same view from the vantage point of an airplane. Id. at




The third-party doctrine limits the extent to which an
individual can claim a legitimate expectation of privacy. 61 In Smith v.
Maryland, the Supreme Court held that an individual lacks a
legitimate expectation of privacy in the telephone numbers he dials
because "telephone users realize that they must 'convey' phone
numbers to the telephone company, since it is through telephone
company switching equipment that their calls are completed."62
Therefore, the Court determined, the pen register-a device that
captures the numbers dialed but not the contents of the
communication-did not constitute a "search" and did not require a
warrant.63
Similarly, United States v. Miller held that a bank customer
lacks a legitimate expectation of privacy in his bank record:64
[The Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the obtaining of information revealed to a
third party and conveyed by him to Government authorities, even if the information is
revealed on the assumption that it will be used only for a limited purpose and the
confidence placed in the third party will not be betrayed.65
These counterintuitive assertions by courts about what
reasonable people expect in their interactions with banks and
telephone companies has come under withering criticism by Fourth
Amendment scholars.66
3. Mail
Not all communications accessible to third parties, however,
lose Fourth Amendment protection. In Ex Parte Jackson, the Court
distinguished between third-party access to mail intended to remain
confidential between the communicants-like a letter or sealed
package-from mail "open to inspection"-like newspapers or
magazines "purposely left in a condition to be examined."'6 The Court
likened the privacy protections for the former category to the
61. See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442-43 (1976) (reasoning that data
maintained by a third-party is not subject to traditional Fourth Amendment protections),
superseded by statute, Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-630, 92 Stat. 3697.
62. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742 (1979).
63. Id. at 745-46.
64. Miller, 425 U.S. at 442.
65. Id. at 443.
66. See Slobogin, supra note 59, at 1591-92 (discussing survey results finding that
"transaction surveillance, as well as overt public camera surveillance are viewed, on average, as
more intrusive than a roadblock, and government efforts to access records from websites, ISPs,
pharmacies, and banks are perceived to be as intrusive as a search of a car").
67. Ex Parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733 (1878).
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protections required when the government seeks to search papers in
an individual's home:68
Letters and sealed packages of this kind in the mail are as fully guarded from
examination and inspection, except as to their outward form and weight, as if they were
retained by the parties forwarding them in their own domiciles. The constitutional
guaranty of the right of the people to be secure in their papers against unreasonable
searches and seizures extends to their papers, thus closed against inspection, wherever
they may be. 6
9
To examine the contents of a sealed letter or package placed in
the mail, the government must either obtain a warrant or gain the
consent of the addressee. 70 In contrast, mail "open to inspection" does
not implicate the Fourth Amendment, and the Court, in dicta,
assumed that Congress could enact legislation permitting the postal
service to inspect such mail and even refuse to deliver it."1
4. Computers
An additional gloss on Fourth Amendment privacy rights has
developed to address the applicability of the Fourth Amendment to
PCs. 7 2 Courts have generally held that individuals have legitimate
expectations of privacy in their home computers. 73 However, some
courts have found that individuals who store documents on a public
computer do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in those
documents. 74 For example, Wilson v. Moreau held that a public library
employee lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in documents
stored on the library's computer system because the library was open
to the public, the computers were available to the public, documents
stored on the computer were accessible to other users, and emails
stored on the system were transmitted through a shared network.75
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 735.
71. Id. at 735-36.
72. See infra text accompanying notes 73-75.
73. See, e.g., United States v. Lifshitz, 369 F.3d 173, 190 (2d Cir. 2004); Guest v. Leis,
255 F.3d 325, 333 (6th Cir. 2001).
74. See Wilson v. Moreau, 440 F. Supp. 2d 81, 104 (D.R.I. 2006).
75. Id. Wilson further acknowledged that courts typically find that individuals have
fewer privacy protections in the workplace than in the home. Id. at 103; see also City of Ontario
v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2630 (2010) (reasoning that even if government employee had
reasonable expectation of privacy in his text messages, the "special needs of the workplace"
permit the employer to conduct warrantless search provided that the search is "reasonable").
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C. Need for the Law
In the 1980s, the development and growth of new
communication technologies created uncertainty regarding the extent
to which the Fourth Amendment applied to new technologies like
electronic mail.76 During this time, the government demanded that
communications companies disclose email messages, without first
seeking a warrant.77 Recognizing the need to clarify existing privacy
protections, as applied to newer technologies, Congress commissioned
the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) to conduct a report on
federal government IT and civil liberties.78
In October of 1985, OTA issued its report, Federal Government
Information Technology: Electronic Surveillance and Civil Liberties.79
The report noted that while the principle behind the Fourth
Amendment remained relevant, the existing statutes and common law
failed to adequately address new electronic surveillance technologies.80
For example, although first-class letters enjoyed robust privacy rights,
the protection afforded mail transmitted electronically remained
"weak, ambiguous, or nonexistent."81  The OTA therefore
recommended that Congress answer the key policy issue of how to
balance civil liberty interests with the needs of law enforcement. 82
Both the House and Senate promulgated bills designed to
strike the proper balance. 83 The debates in Congress debates were
animated by concerns that the "gap" between privacy protections for
traditional mail and email might deter the adoption and development
of these new technologies, encourage unauthorized users to access the
private communications of others, and threaten the admissibility of
evidence. 84 Further, Congress expressed concern that the "precious
76. See OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONG., FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY: ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE AND CIVIL LIBERTIES 21 (1985)
[hereinafter OTA REPORT] (noting that the uncertainty led some courts to look to Congress for
guidance).
77. 132 CONG. REC. S7987-04 (1986) (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy).
78. OTA REPORT, supra note 76, at iii.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 3, 22.
81. Id. at 45.
82. Id. at 12.
83. See H. R. REP. NO. 99-647, at 1 (1986) (discussing House Bill 4952); S. REP. NO. 99-
541, pt. 3, at 5 (1986) (recommending Senate Bill 2575 as striking "a fair balance between the
privacy expectations of American citizens and the legitimate needs of law enforcement
agencies").
84. S. REP. No. 99-541, pt. 3, at 5; H. R. REP. NO. 99-647, at 19.
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right" of privacy would diminish without congressional intervention to
"ensure the continued vitality of the Fourth Amendment."85
D. Stored Communications Act
In light of OTA's findings, Congress enacted the Stored
Communications Act (SCA) as part of the Electronic Communications
Privacy Act (ECPA) of 1986.86 Congress touted the SCA as aligning
newer forms of technology with the Fourth Amendment and
preserving the "vitality" of the Amendment by ensuring that privacy
protections "kept pace" with current advances in technology.87
Congress, under the SCA, enacted privacy measures to protect both
the content of communications-"any information concerning the
substance, purport, or meaning of the communication"88-as well as
non-content information 89-which encompasses both transactional
records, such as account logs, and customer information, such as
users' names, addresses, and telephone numbers.90 This Note focuses
on the contents of "electronic communications." 91
1. Different Services
The Act covers two types of services: electronic communication
services (ECS) and remote computing services (RCS).92 An ECS
means "any service which provides to users thereof the ability to send
or receive wire or electronic communications."93 Under § 2703(a) of
the SCA, the government may require an ECS provider to disclose the
contents of a wire or electronic communication in "electronic
storage,"94 which refers to "any temporary, intermediate storage of a
85. H. R. REP. No. 99-647, at 19.
86. See Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat.
1848 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.).
87. H. R. REP. No. 99-647, at 18.
88. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(8) (2006).
89. Id. § 2703(c).
90. Thomas Dukes , Jr. & Albert C. Rees, Jr., Military Criminal Investigations and the
Stored Communications Act, 64 A.F. L. REV. 103, 106-07 (209). See also 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)
(2006).
91. "Electronic communication" is "any transfer of signs, signals, writing, images,
sounds, data or intelligence of any nature transmitted in whole or in part by a wire, radio,
electromagnetic, photoelectronic or photooptical system that affects interstate or foreign
commerce." 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12) (2006). The term "electronic communication" excludes: (1) wire
or oral communication; (2) communication through a tone-only paging device; (3) communication
from a tracking device; or (4) electronic funds transfer information. Id. § 2510(12)(A)-(D).
92. Id. § 2703(a)-(b).
93. Id. § 2510(15).
94. Id. § 2703(a).
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wire or electronic communication incidental to the electronic
transmission thereof," and "any storage of such communication by an
electronic communication service for purposes of backup protection of
such communication."95
An RCS, by contrast, provides computer storage or processing
services to the public by means of an electronic communications
system.96 Under § 2703(b), the government may compel disclosure by
an RCS provider only if the provider holds or maintains the
communication: (1) "on behalf of' its customers;97 and (2) "solely for
the purpose of providing storage or computer processing" to the
customers, meaning that the provider is authorized to access the
contents of communications only to provide such storage or computer
processing services.98 Law enforcement may compel disclosure of
customer communications under different circumstances, depending
on how the communication is stored, whether by an ECS or RCS, and
the duration of storage. 99 Section 2703 of the SCA dictates what the
government must do to compel disclosure of communications and
records stored by third-party service providers.100 Different standards
apply to communications stored by ECS and RCS providers. 0 1 For
communications in electronic storage for 180 days or fewer by an ECS
provider, the government may require the disclosure of customer
communications only with a federal or state warrant. 102
To compel an RCS provider to disclose the contents of a
communication or to compel an ECS provider to disclose
communications it has maintained for longer than 180 days,103 the
government may: (1) obtain a court order and provide notice to the
customer;104 or (2) obtain an administrative, grand jury, or trial
95. Id. § 2510(17).
96. Id. § 2711(2) An "electronic communications system," as used in the definition of an
RCS, is "any wire, radio, electromagnetic, photooptical or photoelectronic facilities for the
transmission of wire or electronic communications, and any computer facilities or related
electronic equipment for the electronic storage of such communications." Id. § 2510(14).
97. Id. § 2703(b)(2)(A).
98. Id. § 2703(b)(2)(B).
99. See id. § 2703(a)-(b).
100. Id. § 2703.
101. Id. § 2703(a).
102. Id.
103. Id. § 2703(a)-(b).
104. Id. § 2703(b)(1)(B)(ii). The SCA provides for delayed notice of 90 days, provided that
the government has "reason to believe that notification of the existence of the court order may
have an adverse result." Id. § 2705(a)(1)(A) (emphasis added). An "adverse result" includes,
"endangering the life or physical safety of an individual," "flight from prosecution," destruction of
or tampering with evidence," "intimidation of potential witnesses," or "otherwise seriously
jeopardizing an investigation or unduly delaying a trial." Id. § 2705(a)(2)(A)-(E).
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subpoena and notify the customer; 05 or (3) obtain a warrant, with or
without notice. 106 For the sake of clarity, this Note will refer to the
provisions permitting disclosure pursuant to a court order, subpoena,
or warrant as the "tripartite standard."
2. Different Standards
As outlined above, the SCA allows the government to compel
service providers to disclose communications after obtaining court
authorization-a warrant, court order, or subpoena-depending on the
circumstances. 0 7 However, the government must obtain a warrant to
compel an ECS provider to disclose the contents of a communication
maintained in "electronic storage" for 180 days or fewer.108 For the
government to obtain a warrant, the Fourth Amendment requires it to
show probable cause. 109 The "probable cause" standard ensures that,
under the totality of circumstances-including reasonable inferences
drawn therefrom-the government has established at least a "fair
probability" that the defendant committed the crime." 0  This
standard, while more exacting than the standards for court orders and
subpoenas,111 does not require certainty. 112
The second mechanism is the court order, available only for
communications held by an ECS provider in "electronic storage" for
not more thanl80 days, or maintained by an RCS provider for any
length of time.113 The court order requires that the government put
forth "specific and articulable facts showing that there are reasonable
grounds to believe that the contents of a wire or electronic
communication, or the records or other information sought, are
relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation."1 4 The
"specific and articulable facts" standard is an "intermediate" standard,
105. Id. § 2703(b)(1)(B)(i). Notice may be delayed for 90 days if the government has
"reason to believe that notification of the existence of the [administrative] subpoena may have an
adverse result." Id. § 2705(1)(B). The definition of "adverse result" is the same as for court
orders. Id.
106. Id. § 2703(b)(1)(A).
107. Id. § 2703(a)-b).
108. Id. § 2703(a).
109. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
110. United States v. Valdivieso Rodriguez, 532 F. Supp. 2d 332, 340 (D.P.R. 2007).
111. See In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Directing a Provider of Elec. Commc'n
Serv. to Disclose Records to the Gov't, 620 F.3d 304, 314 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing S. REP. 103-402, at
31(1994)).
112. Valdivieso Rodriguez, 532 F. Supp. 2d at 340.
113. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a)-(b).
114. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d).
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lower than probable cause but more demanding than the reasonable
relevance standard that applies to subpoenas.115
The third option is an administrative, grand jury, or trial court
subpoena. 116 The standard for issuing a subpoena is "reasonable
relevance,"117 requiring the government to show that the information
it seeks is reasonably relevant to a criminal investigation. 118
The different standards mean that electronic communications
are subject to greater or lesser privacy protections depending on the
characterization of the service (ECS or RCS) and the duration of the
storage. 119 To review, if the service is characterized as providing ECS
and the communication has been in "electronic storage" for 180 days
or fewer, the government must obtain a warrant by establishing
probable cause, the strictest standard. If the service is an RCS,
though, the government need only provide notice and establish
reasonable relevance to secure a subpoena compelling disclosure.
Thus, communications stored by ECS providers receive greater
protections against compelled disclosure to the government, provided
the communications have been stored for no more than 180 days,
because the government must satisfy a stricter standard to obtain the
communication. With RCS providers, the government can compel
disclosure upon any of the three showings in the tripartite standard,
including the most lenient threshold of showing reasonable relevance,
to access the communication.
II. THE SCA AS INTERPRETED FAILS TO PROTECT USERS' PRIVACY
The extent of an individual user's privacy in the cloud turns on
the characterization of the service provider and the particular content
under a complicated analytical framework. 120 The rubric requires two
characterizations: First, is the service an ECS or an RCS, and if so,
does the communication fall under the requirements for that service?;
Second, if the service is an ECS, has the communication been stored
115. See In re Application of the U.S. for an Order, 620 F.3d at 314; Patricia L. Bellia &
Susan Freiwald, Law in a Networked World: Fourth Amendment Protection for Stored E-mail,
2008 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 121, 128 (2008).
116. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(b)(1)(B)(i); see also In re Subpoena Duces Tecum to AOL, LLC, 550
F. Supp. 2d 606, 611-12 (E.D. Va. 2008) (holding that 18 U.S.C. § 2703 does not permit
disclosure to a governmental entity pursuant to a civil discovery subpoena).
117. Warshak v. United States, 490 F.3d 455, 468 (6th Cir. 2007), vacated on other
grounds, 532 F.3d 521 (6th Cir. 2008).
118. Bellia & Freiwald, supra note 115, at 128. This showing is typically not subject to
judicial review. Id.
119. Compare 18 U.S.C.§ 2703(a) (dealing with ECS), with 18 U.S.C. § 2703(b) (dealing
with RCS).
120. See 18 U.S.C § 2703(a)-(b).
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for 180 days or fewer? This Part explores why the SCA's complex
framework fails to adequately protect computer users' privacy in the
cloud.
A. Distinguishing between Two Types of Services: ECS and RCS
The first step in analyzing whether a particular communication
is subject to the warrant requirement under the SCA is to characterize
the cloud provider's service as either an ECS or an RCS. 1 2 1 This
initial characterization is largely a legal fiction, as most cloud-based
ISPs provide both ECS and RCS. 122 However, characterizing the
service as ECS or RCS remains critical in determining the protections
afforded to communications maintained by that service. 123
The SCA supplements Fourth Amendment protections, and if a
given service cannot be characterized as an ECS or an RCS, the
content held by the provider receives only the protections of the
Fourth Amendment. 124 Although the Fourth Amendment imposes a
warrant requirement, the OTA Report found that courts deemed the
Warrant Clause inapplicable to newer technologies. 12 5 Therefore,
characterizing the service as either an ECS or an RCS not only
determines the protections afforded to a particular communication
under the SCA, 126 but also determines whether the particular
communication will even receive protection against compelled
disclosure to the government.127
If the service enables users "to send or receive wire or
electronic communications," 12 8 and is thus an ECS, the Act protects
the communication, so long as the ECS provider maintains the
communication in "electronic storage."12 9  Two dominant
interpretations of "electronic storage" limit the feasibility of
characterizing cloud-based email services as maintained therein by an
121. See id. (demonstrating that the level of protection against compelled disclosure
depends on the characterization of the particular service).
122. See In re Application of the U.S. for a Search Warrant, for Contents of Elec. Mail
and for an Order Directing a Provider of Elec. Commc'n Servs. to Not Disclose the Existence of
the Search Warrant, 665 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1214 (D. Or. 2009).
123. Id. (emphasis added).
124. Kerr, supra note 10, at 1213.
125. See OTA REPORT, supra note 76, at 22 (finding that statutory and common law
failed to address new technologies); see also id. at 45 (distinguishing between the privacy
protections afforded first-class letter mail and that afforded electronic mail).
126. See 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a)-(b).
127. Kerr, supra note 10, at 1213.
128. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(15).
129. Id. § 2703(a); see also. id. § 2510(17) (stating that "electronic storage" refers to either
"temporary, intermediate storage . . . incidental to the electronic transmission thereof," or
storage for backup purposes).
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ECS provider.130 First, according to the self-described "traditional
narrow interpretation" of the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), a
particular communication is not in "electronic storage" unless stored
in the course of transmission by a service provider; a communication
stored after transmission has been completed cannot be in "electronic
storage."131 Under the DOJ's definition, an email that has been
opened by its recipient is no longer in "electronic storage," but an
email not yet opened by its recipient remains in "temporary,
intermediate storage."132 Therefore, the ISP provides ECS when it
maintains emails on the server, but only until the recipient accesses
the message.
The DOJ's distinction between opened and unopened emails
presupposes that backup storage is limited to that incidental to
transmission,133 contrary to statements in the legislative history
distinguishing between transmission and backup storage. A 1986
House report noted that the House Judiciary Committee distinguished
between storage "associated with transmission and incident thereto,"
and that of a "back-up variety."134 By differentiating between storage
incidental to transmission and storage for backup purposes, this
statement undermines the assumption that storage must be incidental
to transmission. 135
The alternative approach, advocated by the Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit, concludes that emails remaining on an ISP's
server after delivery are in "electronic storage," regardless of whether
the recipient has accessed the message.136  Theofel v. Farey-Jones
130. See infra text accompanying notes 131-158.
131. COMPUTER CRIME AND INTELLECTUAL PROP. SECTION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
SEARCHING AND SEIZING COMPUTERS AND OBTAINING ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL
INVESTIGATIONS, 123 (3d ed. 2009), available at http://www.cybercrime.gov/ssmanual/03ssma.pdf
[hereinafter DOJ SEARCH MANUAL]. Additionally, the DOJ interprets "backup" storage as
"protect[ing] the communication in the event the system crashes before transmission is
complete." Id. at 124 (emphasis added). The statutory definition of "electronic storage" includes
communications stored incidental to transmission, and storage "for purposes of backup
protection of such communication." 18 U.S.C. § 2510(17)(A)-(B). According to the DOJ, the words
"such communication" imply that "messages that are in post-transmission storage after
transmission is complete, are not covered by [the backup storage provision] of the definition of
'electronic storage."' DOJ SEARCH MANUAL, supra, at 124.
132. DOJ SEARCH MANUAL, supra note 131, at 123-24.
133. DOJ SEARCH MANUAL, supra note 131, at 123.
134. H. R. REP. NO. 99-647, at 68 (1986).
135. See Theofel v. Farey-Jones, 359 F.3d 1066, 1076 (9th Cir. 2003) (stating that the
DOJ's interpretation renders the "backup" storage provision redundant).
136. Theofel, 359 F.3d at 1075, 1077. The DOJ rejects the Ninth Circuit approach,
arguing that Theofel "confuses 'backup protection' with ordinary storage of a file." DOJ SEARCH
MANUAL, supra note 122, at 125. Likewise, the Ninth Circuit deems the DOJ interpretation
"erroneous," as "prior access is irrelevant to whether the messages at issue were in electronic
storage." Theofel, 359 F.3d at 1077.
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found that ECS providers hold emails after transmission for purposes
of backup protection under § 2510(17)(B).1 37 According to Theofel, the
DOJ's interpretation of "backup" would deprive § 2510(17)(B) of
independent meaning because almost all messages backed up on a
server also lie in "temporary, intermediate storage."138 The Ninth
Circuit's concluded that an ISP provides ECS when it stores email,
and that an ISP stores an email on its server after delivery as a second
copy of the message in case the user wants to download the message
again.139 Theofel accordingly held that an ISP provides ECS when it
maintains email on its server after transmission, because the email
resides in "electronic storage" for backup purposes and remains there
until the underlying message has expired in its "normal course."140
This holding, if read broadly, appears to encompass both cloud-based
and local-storage email systems.141  The Ninth Circuit in dicta,
however, suggested that the opinion may not apply to webmail; that
is, cloud-based email.142
Although consistent with the legislative history of the SCA, the
Ninth Circuit's approach warrants criticism for treating webmail
differently from traditional email. 143 A broad reading of Theofel would
seem to allow emails transmitted through, and stored on, any email
system to fall under the "backup" storage provision, 144 thereby
providing warrant protection for communications that the DOJ would
deny.145 Yet, dicta in Theofel, as well as later opinions by other courts,
137. Theofel, 359 F.3d at 1075.
138. Id. at 1076; see also Robert M. Goldstein & Martin G. Weinberg, The Stored
Communications Act and Private E-Mail Communications: The Government's Unconstitutional
Policy of Seizing Private E-Mails Without a Warrant or Notice, 31 CHAMPION 18, 23 (2007) ('The
government's interpretation of electronic storage essentially guts the warrant requirement of §
2703(a).").
139. Theofel, 359 F.3d at 1075.
140. Id. at 1076 ("Where the underlying message has expired in the normal course, any
copy is no longer performing any backup function. An ISP that kept permanent copies of
temporary messages could not fairly be described as 'backing up' those messages."). In the
absence of explicit guidance as to what constitutes the "normal course," one commentator argues
that the test is "whether the user or employees of the service provider have reason to believe that
they may need to access an additional copy of the file in the future." Kerr, supra note 10, at 1218
(citing Theofel, 359 F.3d at 1075).
141. See infra text accompanying notes 148-149 (explaining the difference between
webmail and traditional email).
142. Theofel, 359 F.3d. at 1077 ("A remote computing service might be the only place a
user stores his messages; in that case, the messages are not stored for backup purposes.").
143. See supra notes 140-142 and accompanying text (describing in dicta how Theofel
left open whether the holding would apply to cloud-based email systems).
144. Theofel, 359 F.3d at 1076.
145. See DOJ SEARCH MANUAL, supra note 131, at 123-24 (arguing that opened emails
are not in "electronic storage").
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suggest that communications stored in the cloud are not stored for
"backup purposes."
A third approach attempts to reconcile the two dominant
interpretations of "electronic storage" advocated by the DOJ and the
Ninth Circuit, by adopting the dicta from Theofel to find the opinion
inapplicable to cloud-based email. 146 The Central District of Illinois
held in United States v. Weaver that courts may issue a trial subpoena
to compel ISPs to produce the contents of opened emails stored by a
webmail provider for 180 days or fewer because such emails are not in
"electronic storage." 47 Weaver narrowly construed Theofel as applying
only to email systems in which users download messages from the
ISP's server onto their own computers. 148  In contrast, Weaver
reasoned that users of "web-based"-in other words, cloud-email
systems, like Hotmail, generally access their email through the server,
and if they save a message, they typically leave it on the provider's
server.149 By adopting the dicta from Theofel, Weaver concluded that
cloud-based email does not enjoy the same privacy protections as
traditional email and that email stored only in the cloud should not be
considered stored for backup purposes.150
Furthermore, in Crispin v. Christian Audigier, Inc., a lower
court in the Ninth Circuit applied Weaver and the dicta from Theofel
to conclude that once opened, private messages maintained on cloud-
based social networking websites Facebook and MySpace are
maintained by RCS providers. 151 Again applying Theofel, Crispin then
held that Facebook's wall postings and MySpace's comment services
were ECS, and if either the user or the server fails to delete the
communication, the communication remains stored for backup
purposes.152 Given the distinction between webmail and traditional
email raised in dicta in Theofel, the question at least remains open
146. See United States v. Weaver, 636 F. Supp. 2d 769, 772 (C.D. Ill. 2009).
147. Id. at 771-73.
148. Id. at 772.
149. Id. at 772 (citing Fischer v. Mt. Olive Lutheran Church, Inc., 207 F. Supp. 2d 914,
917 (W.D. Wis. 2002)).
150. See Theofel, 359 F.3d at 1077 (arguing that if the message remains only on the RCS,
then the message is not stored for backup purposes); Weaver, 636 F. Supp. 2d at 772 (arguing
that cloud-based emails stored only on the server are not stored for backup purposes).
151. Crispin v. Christian Audigier, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 2d 965, 987 (C.D. Cal. 2010). This
conclusion is consistent with the DOJ's approach, as any communication once opened is
maintained by an RCS provider, if at all. See DOJ SEARCH MANUAL, supra note 131, at 123-24.
152. Crispin, 717 F. Supp. 2d. at 989. Crispin applied Theofel to wall postings and
comments, by applying the rule from Theofel that email services are ECS, and then concluding
that the comments must be stored for backup purposes because they could not be stored in
"temporary, intermediate storage." See id. ("Unlike an email, there is no step whereby a
Facebook wall posting must be opened, at which point it is deemed received."). However, Crispin
alternatively held that the wall posting and comment services were RCS. Id. at 990.
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whether the holding from Theofel applies to cloud-based email
systems. In sum, whether a user's communication falls under the
warrant requirement, or whether a less demanding standard than
probable cause could compel its production, depends not only on the
characterization of the service, but also on the jurisdiction.15 3
As applied to cloud computing, the extent to which
communications-such as emails-sent through cloud-based servers
will receive warrant protection remains unclear.154 The DOJ approach
recognizes limited warrant protection, if any, for electronic
communications, because any email accessed by the recipient, whether
through a traditional email system or the cloud, is not maintained in
"electronic storage" by an ECS.155 In contrast, the Ninth Circuit's
approach in Theofel appears to provide robust privacy protections for
communications stored in any email system by deeming those
communications in "electronic storage" by an ECS provider. 56 In
dicta, though, it left open whether this rule would actually apply to
cloud-based email systems. 57 A third approach, in Weaver, cabins
Theofel's construction of "backup" storage to traditional email
systems 58  The different approaches to the "electronic storage"
provision as applied to cloud computing means that communications
sent and maintained in cloud-based email systems may lie outside the
statutory protection afforded communications stored by ECS
providers.
In contrast to an ECS provider, an RCS provider offers the
public computer storage or processing services.159 Although the SCA
does not define "computer storage," the term is generally interpreted
to mean remote storage. 160 The term "processing services" is also left
undefined, but the legislative history indicates that it means
153. See 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a)-(b) (2006) (different protections for ECS and RCS); Theofel,
359 F.3d at 1077 (rejecting the DOJ's interpretation of "electronic storage"); DOJ SEARCH
MANUAL, supra note 122, at 125 (rejecting the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of "electronic
storage").
154. See infra text accompanying notes 155-158.
155. See DOJ SEARCH MANUAL, supra note 131, at 123-24 (stating that communications
maintained by the service provider after transmission is complete are not in "electronic storage").
156. See Theofel v. Farey-Jones, 359 F.3d 1066, 1075-76 (9th Cir. 2003) (stating that
communications maintained after transmission are in "electronic storage" until the copy has
expired in the "normal course").
157. See id. at 1077 (reasoning that a message is not stored for backup purposes if the
RCS is the only place the message is stored).
158. United States v. Weaver, 636 F. Supp. 2d 769, 772 (C.D. Ill. 2009). Under Weaver,
emails sent through cloud-based systems are not in "electronic storage" by an ECS provider, and
thus are not subject to the warrant requirement, because the email is not in "backup" when it
remains only on the server. Id.
159. 18 U.S.C. § 2711(2).
160. See Kerr, supra note 10, at 1229-30.
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outsourcing functions. 161 To qualify for the protections the statute
affords communications stored by an RCS provider, the RCS provider
must maintain the communication: (1) "on behalf of' the RCS
provider's customer; 162 and (2) "solely for the purpose of providing
storage or computer processing" to the customer, such that the
provider's authority to access the communication is limited to the
extent necessary to provide storage or computer processing services.163
One court found that the video upload website YouTube
provided RCS for users, though the court did not explain its
reasoning. 64 Likewise, although Crispin held that Facebook's wall
postings and MySpace's comment services constituted ECS, it held in
the alternative that the services were RCS. 65 As to RCS, Crispin
concluded that although Facebook and MySpace maintained
communications for display as well as for storage purposes, display
was necessary in order to enable users to retrieve their stored
messages. 166 Display and storage were therefore inseparable, and
thus Facebook and MySpace maintained the communications "solely"
for storage purposes.167
B. Example
As an example of the practical problems inherent in applying
this framework to cloud services, consider Gmail, Google's cloud-based
161. Id. at 1230. See S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 3 (1986) ("For example, physicians and
hospitals maintain medical files in offsite data banks, businesses of all sizes transmit their
records to remote computers to obtain sophisticated data processing services.").
162. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(b)(2)(A).
163. Id. § 2703(b)(2)(B).
164. Viacom Int'l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 253 F.R.D. 256, 258, 264 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
165. Crispin v. Christian Audigier, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 2d 965, 989-90 (C.D. Cal. 2010).
166. Id. It is unclear why Crispin failed to conclude that Facebook could not provide RCS
as it does not maintain communications "solely" for computer processing and storage, given that
Facebook's Privacy Policy indicates that it collects "content" information when a user posts on
another user's wall, and uses the information to serve personal advertising and other services to
users. See Facebook's Privacy Policy, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/policy.php (last
updated Dec. 22, 2010). Facebook collects "content" information when the user updates his
status, uploads photos or videos, shares a link, creates an event or group, makes a comment,
writes on someone's wall, writes a note, or sends a private message to another user. Id. Facebook
lists the following ways it uses such content information: (i) to manage the service; (ii) to make
announcements; (iii) to serve targeted advertising; (iv) to serve social ads; (v) to supplement a
user's profile; (vi) to provide suggestions; and (vii) to help a user's friends locate the user. Id.
Although Crispin rejected the display argument because the storage does not have to be for the
benefit of the user but can be for the benefit of the ISP, advertising could only be construed as
"processing services" under a very broad reading of "processing services." See Crispin, 717 F.
Supp. 2d at 990.
167. Crispin, 717 F. Supp. 2d at 989-90.
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email service.168 The two-step framework first requires characterizing
the service and determining whether the communication satisfies the
requirements for protection, and then to calculate the duration of
storage. The first issue is whether Gmail's cloud services are better
characterized as either ECS or RCS, or neither. Gmail's
communication services satisfy the definition of an ECS, because users
can "send or receive . . . electronic communications" through instant
messaging ("chat") and email.169 However, the storage of emails
transmitted through Gmail's server may not qualify as "electronic
storage" for a few different reasons.
First, once transmission is complete, the email no longer
remains in "temporary, intermediate storage" because its storage is no
longer "incidental" to transmission. 17 0  Second, Gmail encourages
users to save their emails even after transmission is complete, by
providing users more than 7000 MB of free storage and allowing users
to purchase additional storage. 7 1 Third, Gmail encourages users to
archive their messages "so that they are always available and always
searchable." 17 2  Because such storage is neither temporary nor
incidental to transmission, an email sent through Gmail's server
cannot receive post-transmission protection unless stored for "backup"
purposes.
The three different constructions of § 2703(a), discussed
previously, probably provide different answers to the question of
whether an email sent through Gmail is stored for "backup purposes."
Under the DOJ's approach, once the recipient of the email retrieves
the message, the email is no longer stored for backup purposes.173
Although a court following Theofel may find that Gmail stores
communications on its server for "backup purposes," and therefore
168. See What Happens to Messages Stored on Gmail's Servers?, GOOGLE,
http://mail.google.com/support/binlanswer.py?answer=13288 (last updated Jan. 24, 2011)
(discussing how messages are stored on Gmail's servers, rather than on a user's computer, and
the user may download a particular message to his computer).
169. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(15) (2006); see also Getting Started Guide, GOOGLE,
http://mail.google.com/support/bin/static.py?page=guide.cs&guide=24916 (last visited Feb. 4,
2011) (providing a brief overview of Gmail's email features).
170. See Theofel v. Farey-Jones, 359 F.3d 1066, 1075 (9th Cir. 2003) (explaining that
"temporary, intermediate storage" is limited to storage of messages "pending delivery"); DOJ
SEARCH MANUAL, supra note 131, at 123 (explaining that "electronic storage" is limited to
storage "made in the course of transmission").
171. Top 10 Reasons to Use Gmail, GOOGLE, http://mail.google.com/mail/help/about.html
(last visited Feb. 4, 2011).
172. Crispin v. Christian Audigier, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 2d 965, 977 n.20 (C.D. Cal. 2010)
(quoting Alexander Scolnik, Note, Protections for Electronic Communications: The Stored
Communications Act and the Fourth Amendment, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 349, 378-79 (2009)).
173. See DOJ SEARCH MANUAL, supra note 131, at 123-24.
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provides "electronic storage,"174 Weaver counsels against applying
Theofel to web-based email systems.175  Thus, although Gmail's
privacy policy asserts backup protection of email communications, 1 76
the fact that they remain on the server means that, except under
Theofel, the communications are not maintained in "electronic
storage" for backup purposes.177 For cloud-based email then, the DOJ
and Weaver likely would find that the government need not obtain a
warrant to compel the ISP to disclose communications stored on the
server, because the ISP's services lie outside the Act's provisions for
an ECS.178 Therefore, for emails and other communications on Gmail
to enjoy protection under the SCA, they must be deemed stored by an
RCS provider.
Assuming for the sake of argument that Gmail's
communication services satisfy the definition of an RCS under §
2711(2), by providing public computer storage or processing
services, 179 Gmail still fails to satisfy the conditions for protection as
communications stored by an RCS. 80 Gmail maintains emails sent by
users to process user inquiries and improve Gmail services, 181 thus
satisfying the requirement of § 2703(b)(2)(A) that communications be
held on a Gmail customer's behalf.182 However, Gmail's Privacy Policy
states that Gmail may access user communications to improve and
develop new advertising services.183 Because Gmail maintains and
accesses communications to improve services that constitute neither
remote storage nor outsourcing functions, Gmail fails to satisfy the
second requirement for an RCS, as it does not maintain
communications "solely for the purpose of providing storage or
computer processing services." 184 This result comports with Flagg v.
City of Detroit, in which the Eastern District of Michigan concluded
that although an RCS provider stored text messages, the
communications did not receive protection under the RCS provisions
174. See Theofel, 359 F.3d at 1076.
175. See United States v. Weaver, 636 F. Supp. 2d 769, 772 (C.D. Ill. 2009).
176. Privacy Policy, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/privacypolicy.html (last modified
Oct. 3, 2010).
177. Weaver, 636 F. Supp. 2d at 772; DOJ SEARCH MANUAL, supra note 131, at 123-24.
But see Theofel, 359 F.3d at 1076.
178. See supra text accompanying note 174. See also 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a) (2006) (showing
that communication not maintained in electronic storage by an ECS provider does not require a
warrant under the SCA).
179. Id. § 2711(2).
180. See infra notes 182-184.
181. Privacy Policy, supra note 176.
182. See 18 U.S.C. § 2703(b)(2)(A).
183. Privacy Policy, supra note 176.
184. See 18 U.S.C.S. § 2703(b)(2)(B) (Lexis) (emphasis added).
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because the contract between the customer and the service provider
allowed the provider to retrieve text messages from its archives.185
This meant it did not maintain the messages "solely" for storage or
computer processing.186
Gmail's services are distinguishable from those analyzed in
Crispin because in Crispin, the social networking websites had to
display communications to enable users to retrieve them from
storage,187 whereas Gmail provides advertising services that are
unnecessary for users to access emails.188 Thus, when a customer
consents to a user agreement which permits the service provider to
access his data to provide targeted advertising, the user's emails may
not be protected as communications maintained by an RCS
provider.189 As this analysis makes clear, cloud services such as Gmail
may not qualify, under the SCA, as either an ECS or RCS, leaving
users with the uncertain protections of the Fourth Amendment. 190
C. Adding a Second Layer: The 180-Day Rule
Even assuming that a particular cloud service could be
characterized as an ECS, the 180-day rule imposes an additional layer
of complexity as to whether a communication is subject to the warrant
requirement.191 While the government must obtain a warrant to
compel a service provider to disclose communications in "electronic
storage" for 180 days or fewer, those stored for 181 days or more are
obtainable under the tripartite standard. 192
The legislative history illuminates the basis for the 180-day
rule, although without empirical support. According to the 1986
House Report,
Most-if not all-electronic communications systems (such as electronic mail systems),
however, only keep copies of messages for a few months. To the extent that the record is
185. Flagg v. City of Detroit, 252 F.R.D. 346, 359, 363 (E.D. Mich. 2008).
186. Id.
187. Crispin v. Christian Audigier, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 2d 965, 990 (C.D. Cal. 2010).
188. See Privacy Policy, supra note 176. There is no suggestion in the privacy policy that
advertising services are necessary to enable users to send and receive communications sent
through its servers. See id.
189. William J. Robison, Note, Free at What Cost?: Cloud Computing Privacy Under the
Stored Communications Act, 98 GEO. L.J. 1195, 1214 (2010).
190. See Kerr, supra note 10, at 1213 (explaining that when a particular service cannot
be characterized as either ECS or RCS then only Fourth Amendment protections apply, but the
SCA was enacted to address gaps in applying Fourth Amendment to new technologies).
191. See 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a) (2006) (demonstrating that once the service is characterized




kept beyond that point it is closer to a regular business record maintained by a third
party and, therefore, deserving of a different standard of protection.1
9 3
According to Professor Kerr, the 180-day rule may be a relic of the
Fourth Amendment's abandonment doctrine, which holds that
abandoning property forfeits any Fourth Amendment protections.194 If
so, the drafters of the 180-day rule may have treated unopened files
that had not been accessed for over 180 days as abandoned.195 An
"abandoned" message is then subject to the SCA's limited protections
for non-content information, the disclosure of which, under § 2703(c),
the government may compel with a court order.196
Accepting the DOJ's distinction between opened and unopened
email avoids the added protections of § 2703(a), as any opened email is
not in "electronic storage" and thus cannot be considered maintained
by an ECS provider.197 Under the DOJ interpretation, once the
recipient retrieves the message, the ISP is treated as providing RCS
as to that communication, and the government can compel the ISP to
disclose the contents of that communication under the more lenient
tripartite standard. 198 The DOJ effectively transforms the email, once
accessed, to a communication maintained by an RCS provider
pursuant to § 2703(b). 199 For unopened emails, those stored for 180
days or fewer are subject to the warrant requirement, while unopened
emails stored by the ECS provider in "electronic storage" for more
than 180 days may be disclosed pursuant to the tripartite standard. 200
Thus, the same communication is subject to the heightened
protections of the probable cause standard when the communication
has not yet been opened by the recipient, but obtainable by the
government under the tripartite standard once the recipient accesses
the message.
The DOJ's approach appears inconsistent with the fact that
Congress designed the 180-day rule partly on the assumption that
people saved their emails for a few months. 201 In light of this finding,
a user's decision to keep an opened message for a few months does not
always suggest an intent to abandon the message, but could equally
193. H. R. REP. NO. 99-647, at 68 (1986).
194. Kerr, supra note 10, at 1234.
195. Id. (citing United States v. Jones, 707 F.2d 1169, 1172 (10th Cir. 1983) ("When
individuals voluntarily abandon property, they forfeit any expectation of privacy in it that they
might have had.")).
196. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(1)(B).




201. See H. R. REP. No. 99-647, at 68 (1986).
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reflect the user's intention to save the email for later reference. 202
Further, "opened" and "unopened" do not appear in § 2703 and the
DOJ effectively reads in these limitations, although foreign to the
statutory language. 203
In contrast, the Ninth Circuit does not distinguish between
opened and unopened emails, but instead tracks the language of §
2703.204 Specifically, for communications stored by an ECS provider
for 180 days or fewer, no governmental entity may compel disclosure
unless it obtains a warrant.205 Communications stored by an ECS
provider for 181 days or more may be disclosed if the tripartite
standard is met. 2 06 Whether the recipient accessed the message is
irrelevant. 207
Although the Ninth Circuit's approach appears closest to the
apparent policy in the legislative history and to the statutory
language, the 180-day rule is itself subject to criticism. 208 At the
September 2010 hearings before the House of Representatives,
Michael Hintze, Associate General Counsel at Microsoft, argued that
the technological assumptions behind the 180-day rule are
outdated:209
A decade after the enactment of [the] ECPA, in 1996, Microsoft was offering the first
version of Microsoft Exchange-server and desktop software in which a user typically
would download email to a local machine for it to be read and stored, after which it
would no longer reside on the server. Because email typically was downloaded to a local
drive to be read and stored, it was reasonable to conclude that email left with a service
provider for more than 180 days was abandoned with little expectation of privacy.
2 1 0
But with the advent of cloud computing and the increase in online
storage capacity, users today store their emails and files online for
years, while expecting that their data will receive the same privacy
protections on day 181 as on day 179.211 Richard Salgado, Senior
202. See id.
203. See 18 U.S.C. § 2703.
204. See id. (citing Theofel v. Farey-Jones, 359 F.3d 1066 (9th Cir. 2004)).
205. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a) (2006).
206. Id.
207. Theofel, 359 F.3d at 1077.
208. See infra text accompanying notes 209-213.
209. See September 23 Hearing, supra note 12, at 32 (statement of Michael Hintze,
Associate General Counsel, Microsoft Corporation) (noting that the "basic technological
assumptions upon which the Act was based and the nature of protection given to user data
stored in the cloud have not kept pace with the unprecedented digitization and storage of online
data that cloud computing has enabled"); see also id. at 124 (statement of Marc J. Zwillinger,
Partner, Zwillinger Genetski LLP) (deeming the 180-day rule "arbitrary and based on a false
assumption").





Counsel of Law Enforcement and Information Security for Google,
Inc., apparently agrees with Hintze, as he could think of no reason to
reduce the privacy protections afforded messages that have been
opened or stored for 181 days.212
Moreover, it is ironic that statutory protection applies
primarily to the messages that need it the least, because while "the
emails or private messages that are both the most important and the
most private are the older messages that you have read through
several times and have intentionally decided to save . . .. By contrast,
the unopened emails in your inbox are likely to be commercial
solicitations that you have not yet had time to delete. 213 Yet courts
have found that the SCA requires the government to obtain a warrant
to access those unopened emails, while the protection afforded to
saved emails remains unclear.214
Gmail illustrates the implications of the 180-day versus 181-
day distinction. Under the DOJ's approach to opened emails, the
effect of the 180-day rule would be limited to unopened messages, 215
because the DOJ restricts "communications in electronic storage"-
and thus, the warrant protection for communications maintained by
an ECS-to messages stored but not yet accessed by the recipient.216
By treating the Gmail messages as stored by an RCS, the DOJ
approach denies the email warrant protection, which allows the
government to compel Gmail to disclose the communication if it
satisfies tripartite standard. 217
In the Ninth Circuit, though, it remains unclear whether the
SCA covers communications stored in the cloud. 218 Applying only the
holding from Theofel, and assuming Gmail provides ECS, the
government needs a warrant to compel disclosure of the
communication only if stored for 180 days or less, while a court order
212. Id. at 21 (statement of Richard Salgado, Senior Counsel, Law Enforcement and
Information Security, Google, Inc.) ("It's difficult to imagine a justification for a rule that lowers
the procedural protection for a message merely because it is six months old or has been viewed
by the user.").
213. September 23 Hearing, supra note 12, at 123 (statement of Marc J. Zwillinger,
Partner, Zwillinger Genetski LLP).
214. Id.
215. See DOJ SEARCH MANUAL, supra note 131, at 138.
216. DOJ SEARCH MANUAL, supra note 131, at 124.
217. Id. See 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a)-(b) (stating that the 180-181 day distinction only applies
to communications stored by an ECS in "electronic storage").
218. See Theofel v. Farey-Jones, 359 F.3d 1066, 1075-76 (9th Cir. 2003) (stating that
communications maintained after transmission are in "electronic storage" by an ECS provider);
United States v. Weaver, 636 F. Supp. 2d 769, 772 (C.D. Ill. 2009) (refusing to apply Theofel to
webmail).
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or subpoena would suffice if stored for at least 181 days. 219 If Gmail
provides RCS instead, then the 180-day rule is inapplicable. 22 0 If,
however, the limitation from Weaver applies, the 180-day rule may not
enter the analysis for communications stored in the cloud. 221
Therefore, the level of privacy protection depends on the service
characterization, storage duration, and jurisdiction.
D. Critiquing the Complex Framework
This analysis demonstrates the complexity of the SCA's current
framework. When Congress enacted the SCA, it believed that the bill
struck a "fair balance between the privacy expectations of citizens and
the legitimate needs of law enforcement." 22 2 However, as applied to
cloud computing technology, the various approaches adopted by the
DOJ and .the Ninth Circuit strike different balances between
individual privacy and law enforcement needs.223 The DOJ approach,
by distinguishing between opened and unopened emails, tips the scale
in favor of law enforcement, for whom the DOJ views the SCA as a
"vital tool."2 2 4 The interpretation of DOJ favors law enforcement by
conceptualizing the SCA not as protecting individual privacy, but as
regulating how the government can obtain access to stored
communications. 22 5
In contrast, the Ninth Circuit's approach remains ambiguous
as to whether communications stored in the cloud are in "electronic
storage."226 However, the Ninth Circuit has held that emails stored on
the servers of email systems after transmission are stored for backup
purposes, thereby preserving a sphere of individual privacy. 227
219. See Theofel, 359 F.3d at 1075 (reasoning that messages remaining on an ISP's
server after delivery are stored for purposes of backup protection and thus are in "electronic
storage" subject to the 180-day rule in § 2703(a)).
220. See 18 U.S.C. § 2703(b).
221. See Weaver, 636 F. Supp. 2d at 772 (stating that Theofel only applies to non-
webmail systems).
222. H. R. REP. No. 99-647, at 19 (1986); S. REP. No. 99-541, pt. 3, at 5 (1986).
223. See infra notes 224-228.
224. The Electronic Communications Privacy Act: Promoting Security and Privacy in the
Digital Age: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 2 (2010) [hereinafter
September 22 Hearing] (statement of James A. Baker, Associate Deputy Att'y Gen., United
States Department of Justice).
225. See DOJ SEARCH MANUAL, supra note 131, at 115.
226. Compare Theofel v. Farey-Jones, 359 F.3d 1066, 1076 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding was
not limited to traditional email systems), with Crispin v. Christian Audigier, Inc., 717 F. Supp.
2d 965, 987 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (holding that cloud-based social networking websites provided RCS
when they stored private messages previously opened by the recipients), and Weaver, 636 F.
Supp. 2d at 772 (refusing to apply Theofel to webmail).
227. Theofel, 359 F.3d at 1075-77.
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Because it treats such communications as stored by an ECS provider,
the Ninth Circuit's approach provides greater privacy than that of the
DOJ, at least for communications stored for 180 days or fewer.228 Yet,
given the uncertainty regarding the applicability of Theofel to
communications stored in the cloud, it remains unclear whether the
180-day rule applies to already opened email stored in the cloud. 2 29
Thus, both the DOJ and the Ninth Circuit balance individual privacy
interests with government investigative needs, but reach different
results based on their different outlooks. 230
III. PIERCING THE ACT'S CLOUDINESS
A. Current Debate
The preceding discussion demonstrates that the SCA fails to
provide a clear framework for understanding whether a user has a
reasonable expectation of privacy in his communications stored in the
cloud.231 Because Congress enacted the SCA as part of ECPA in the
late 1980s and has not amended it to address cloud computing, 232 the
ECPA-specifically, the SCA-needs to be revisited. Digital Due
Process (DDP), a coalition of privacy advocates, think tanks, and
major corporations, also seeks to amend the SCA. 23 3 DDP is lobbying
Congress to better balance the privacy interests of citizens with the
legitimate needs of law enforcement agencies:234
ECPA is a patchwork of confusing standards that have been interpreted inconsistently
by the courts, creating uncertainty for both service providers and law enforcement
agencies. ECPA can no longer be applied in a clear and consistent way, and,
consequently, the vast amount of personal information generated by today's digital
communication services may no longer be adequately protected. 2 35
Among its proposals for modernizing the ECPA, DDP recommends
that the government only compel a covered service provider to disclose
communications with a warrant, "regardless of the age of the
228. Compare id. (reasoning that emails remaining on an ISP's server after transmission
are in "electronic storage"), with DOJ SEARCH MANUAL, supra note 131, at 123-24 (stating that
any opened email is not in "electronic storage").
229. See supra text accompanying notes 136 -144.
230. See supra text accompanying notes 224-228.
231. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 155-158 (discussing the various conflicting
approaches and the remaining uncertainty in the Ninth Circuit).
232. About the Issue, DIGITAL DUE PROCESS, http://www.digitaldueprocess.org (last
visited Feb. 4, 2011).
233. Who We Are, DIGITAL DUE PROCESS, http://www.digitaldueprocess.org (follow "Who
We Are" hyperlink at top of page) (last visited Feb. 1, 2011) (noting that DDP members include,
Amazon.com, ACLU, AT&T, Facebook, Intel, and Microsoft).
234. See About the Issue, supra note 232.
235. Id.
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communications, the means or status of their storage or the provider's
access to or use of the communications in its normal business
operations."236
DDP's lobbying efforts have made progress toward amending
the SCA. 2 3 7 Answering DDP's calls to amend the SCA, on May 5,
2010, the House Subcommittee on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and
Civil Liberties, held a hearing on the ECPA.2 38 In his opening
statement before the Subcommittee, Chairman Jerrold Nadler
asserted that the hearing would be the first of many to determine
whether and how to amend the Act. 2 3 9 Nadler framed the issue as
whether the SCA still strikes the appropriate balance between the
interests of law enforcement and individual privacy, 240 given the
"enormous technological advances" in electronic communications since
Congress passed the Act.2 4 1
All four witnesses testifying before the Subcommittee
referenced and supported DDP's elementary principles for reform.242
James X. Dempsey, Vice President for Public Policy at the Center for
Democracy and Technology, argued that the SCA should afford the
same protections and standards for government access to data,
whether stored locally or in the cloud. 2 4 3 Further, Dempsey argued
that the probable cause standard should protect the content of
communications, regardless of the duration of storage or whether the
236. Our Principles, DIGITAL DUE PROCESS, http://digitaldueprocess.org (Follow "Our
Principles" hyperlink at top of page) (last visited Feb. 4, 2011).
237. See Electronic Communications Privacy Act Reform: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th
Cong. 2 (2010) [hereinafter May 5 Hearing] (statement of Mr. F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr.,
Ranking Member, Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties) (documenting
hearings held in response to calls by the DDP to amend the SCA).
238. Id.
239. Id. at 1 (statement of Mr. Jerrold Nadler, Chairman, Subcomm. on the Constitution,
Civil Rights, & Civil Liberties). Ranking Member of the Subcommittee, Mr. F. James
Sensenbrenner, Jr., agreed that this hearing was only the first step. Id. at 3 (statement of Mr. F.
James Sensenbrenner, Jr., Ranking Member, Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and
Civil Liberties) ("There has neither been sufficient time to examine the concepts that are being
advanced in any meaningful way, nor has there been time to hear from other stakeholders,
including relevant members of the law enforcement community.').
240. Id. at 2 (statement of Mr. Jerrold Nadler, Chairman, Subcomm. on the Constitution,
Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties).
241. Id. at I (statement of Mr. Jerrold Nadler, Chairman, Subcomm. on the Constitution,
Civil Rights, & Civil Liberties).
242. See, e.g., May 5 Hearing, supra note 237, at 52 (statement of Annmarie Levins,
Associate General Counsel, Microsoft Corporation) (supporting Digital Due Process's efforts at
reform).
243. Id. at 11 (statement of James X. Dempsey, Vice President for Public Policy, Center
for Democracy and Technology).
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communication was opened. 244 And Orin S. Kerr echoes Dempsey's
recommendation for a warrant requirement, whatever the time stored
or service provided. 245
House and Senate committees held a second round of hearings
in September 2010.246 Unlike the first round in May 2010, the
September hearings generated far more debate between proponents
seeking privacy protections for citizens and advocates favoring
flexibility for law enforcement. 247 Witnesses testifying for greater
privacy protections all supported at least the basic DDP principles,2 4 8
but viewed them only as a springboard for future discussions. 249 One
such witness criticized the DOJ's distinction between opened and
unopened emails, as well as the "arbitrary" 180-day rule, as
nonsensical. 250
On the law enforcement side of the debate, witnesses worried
that criminals are now taking advantage of new technologies to create
a "cloak of invisibility" from traditional law enforcement detection.251
Consistent with this concern, James A. Baker, Associate Deputy
244. Id. at 14; see also id. at 56 (statement of Annmarie Levins, Associate General
Counsel, Microsoft Corporation) (noting that "information in the cloud should be protected in the
same way that their ... [h]ard drive would").
245. Id. at 37 (statement of Orin S. Kerr, Profesoor, George Washington University Law
School). Kerr argued that the warrant requirement could be subject to limited exceptions,
including permitting the government to compel disclosure pursuant to a subpoena for corporate
crimes and in cases of misconduct by government employees. Id. at 38. See also id. at 28
(statement of Albert Gidari, Partner, Perkins Coic LLP) (recommending a warrant for all content
stored in the cloud).
246. See September 23 Hearings, supra note 12; September 22 Hearings, supra note 224.
247. Compare September 22 Hearings, supra note 224, at 2 (statement of James A.
Baker, Associate Deputy Att'y Gen., United States Department of Justice) (arguing that the SCA
is a "vital tool" for law enforcement, and that Congress should be cautious in changing the SCA),
with September 23 Hearings, supra note 12, at 38 (statement of Michael Hintze, Associate
General Counsel, Microsoft Corporation) ("[Wie support the responsible reform of ECPA to
ensure that users have the same privacy rights for their data in the cloud as they do for their on-
premises data.").
248. See generally September 23 Hearings, supra note 12, at 3 (statement of Michael
Hintze, Associate General Counsel, Microsoft Corporation) (supporting DDP principles for
reform); id. at 22 (statement of Richard Salgado, Senior Counsel, Law Enforcement and
Information Security, Google, Inc.) (supporting DDP principles for reform); id. at 5 (statement of
Paul Misener, Vice President for Global Public Policy, Amazon.com) (agreeing with DDP
principles that a warrant should be required to compel a cloud service provider to disclose
content of communications stored on its server).
249. Id. at 36 (statement of Michael Hintze, Associate General Counsel, Microsoft
Corporation).
250. Id. at 124-25 (statement of Marc J. Zwillinger, Partner, Zwillinger Genetski LLP).
251. Id. at 2 (statement of Kurt F. Schmid, Exec. Dir., Chi. High Intensity Drug
Trafficking Area); see also id. at 107 (statement of Thomas B. Hurbanek, Senior Investigator,
New York State Police Computer Crime Unit) (arguing that certain cloud computing technologies
"could create an environment where entire segments of business activity could be conducted
outside of the reach of law enforcement").
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Attorney General, reframed the issue from ensuring the privacy of
citizens to protecting the public from crime:252
[W]e urge Congress to proceed with caution; and to avoid amendments that would
disrupt the fundamental balance between privacy protection and public safety.
Congress should refrain from making changes that would impair the government's
ability to obtain critical information necessary to build criminal, national security, and
cyber investigations, particularly if those changes would not provide any appreciable or
meaningful improvement in privacy protection. 2 5 3
Two other witnesses supporting the law enforcement perspective
echoed Baker's assertion, recommending that Congress tread carefully
in reforming the SCA, lest it lose the current balance between privacy
and law enforcement. 254
B. Need for Reform
The SCA has not kept up with the growth of technology since
its enactment in 1986.255 Edward W. Felten, a Professor of Computer
Science and Public Affairs at Princeton University, observed that
much has changed in twenty-five years:
In 1986, when ECPA was passed, the Internet consisted of a few thousand
computers . .. . There were no web pages, because the web had not been invented.
Google would not be founded for another decade. Twitter would not be founded for
another two decades. Mark Zuckerberg, who would grow up to start Facebook, was two
years old.2 5 6
Advances in technology spurred important developments in the
role the Internet plays in people's everyday lives.2 5 7 While email
252. September 22 Hearings, supra note 224, at 5-7 (statement of James A. Baker,
Associate Deputy Att'y Gen., United States Department of Justice).
253. Id. at 5-6.
254. September 23 Hearings, supra note 12, at 105 (statement of Thomas B. Hurbanek,
Senior Investigator, New York State Police Computer Crime Unit) (arguing that "any reforms
must be carefully weighed to preserve the existing balance between individual privacy and the
ability of law enforcement to conduct investigations and protect the public"); id. at 6 (statement
of Kurt F. Schmid, Executive Director, Chicago High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area) ("Any
reform of the ECPA should address new and emerging technologies without unduly hampering
or constraining law enforcement in its mission to protect the public.").
255. See id. at 7 (statement of Fred H. Cate, C. Ben Dutton Professor of Law and
Director of the Center for Applied Cybersecurity Research, Indiana University) (explaining that
"dramatic changes in technologies and online services," like cloud computing, have left the SCA
"inadequate to protect privacy today").
256. Id. at 12 (statement of Edward W. Felten, Professor of Computer Science and Public
Affairs, Princeton University); see also Crispin v. Christian Audigier, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 2d 965,
972 n.15 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (citing William Jeremy Robison, Note, Free at What Cost?: Cloud
Computing Privacy Under the Stored Communications Act, 98 GEO. L.J. 1195, 1198 (2010))
(noting that the World Wide Web was not introduced until 1990, and the web browser was not
introduced until 1994).
257. September 23 Hearings, supra note 12, at 12 (statement of Edward W. Felten,
Professor of Computer Science and Public Affairs, Princeton University).
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increasingly replaces first-class mail, there is no reason to believe that
such a replacement affects individual privacy expectations. 2 5 8
At best, changes in technology have left cloud-based
communications with uncertain protection; at worst-and more
likely-they lie outside the protections of the SCA altogether. 259
Cloud-based email, such as Gmail,, does not fit comfortably within
either the ECS or RCS characterization, casting doubt on whether the
government must obtain a warrant access such communications. 260
Further, new technology not captured by the SCA has created a
"murky legal landscape" that fails to address the interests of
customers, service providers, and the government.261 The lack of
guidance inhibits the efficiency of law enforcement, as officials must
decide whether to "take the chance of stepping over the line-risking
suppression of evidence or even personal sanctions-or shy away from
the line to avoid overstepping." 26 2 A consistent standard would benefit
law enforcement by providing a predictable framework that would
allow the government to act affirmatively to compel disclosure of
electronic communications, without the risk that evidence will be
deemed inadmissible.
Service providers would also benefit from a predictable
standard. The complexity of the SCA offers insufficient clarity for
service providers to structure their conduct appropriately, and in fact,
the law is so unclear that service providers "essentially guess" at what
the Act requires. 263 A service provider must correctly characterize a
particular service as either ECS or RCS, for if it mischaracterizes the
service and discloses communications under a less burdensome
standard, civil liability could result.264
Furthermore, the SCA's obscurity and inconsistent
requirements reduces the incentives for businesses and consumers to
develop and employ potentially more efficient cloud-based services.2 65
Failing to ensure the privacy of communications stored in the cloud
deters users from storing their data there. In any event, users likely
do not know that they have greater privacy when they store their
258. Id. at 5 (statement of Perry Robinson, Associate General Counsel, Rackspace
Hosting).
259. See supra text accompanying notes 168-190.
260. See supra text accompanying notes 168-190.
261. September 22 Hearings, supra note 224, at 6 (statement of James X. Dempsey, Vice
President for Public Policy, Center for Democracy and Technology).
262. May 5 Hearings, supra note 237, at 75 (statement of J. Beckwith Burr, Partner,
Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale & Dorr, LLP).
263. Id. at 22 (statement of Albert Gidari, Partner, Perkins Coie LLP).
264. Id. at 27.
265. September 23 Hearings, supra note 12, at 21-22 (statement of Richard Salgado,
Senior Counsel, Law Enforcement and Information Security, Google, Inc.).
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communications locally than in the cloud." 2 6 6 Similarly, businesses
may decline to develop and invest in new technology without clear
guidelines regarding privacy. 267
C. Constitutionality
The questionable constitutionality of the SCA provides another
reason for Congress to reform the Act.2 68 Some commentators argue
that allowing the government to compel disclosure of email
communications without a warrant violates the Supreme Court's
"closed container" jurisprudence. 2 6 9 The "closed container" doctrine
holds that the government must obtain a warrant to search a package
"closed against inspection," regardless of its location.270 An email
stored on an ISP's server may constitute a "closed container," as email
accounts are typically password-protected, and the ISP has limited
access to the contents of the communication. 2 7 1 Users thereby possess
objectively reasonable expectations of privacy in their emails, 27 2 and
as with first-class mail, emails stored in the cloud should fall within
the scope of the Fourth Amendment. 273 Other commentators argue
that the SCA's denial of warrant protection for emails stored longer
than 180 days by an ECS is unconstitutional, as users reasonably
expect the same level of privacy in their communications on day 181
as on day 180.274
Courts have approached the constitutionality of the SCA
cautiously. 275 In 2006, the Southern District of Ohio, in Warshak v.
United States, held facially unconstitutional the combination of §
2703(b)(1)(B)(ii) and § 2703(d), which together permit the government
to compel disclosure with merely a court order-and without notice. 276
In 2007, the Sixth Circuit affirmed, concluding that users reasonably
266. Id. at 34 (statement of Michael Hintze, Associate General Counsel, Microsoft
Corporation).
267. Id. at 28.
268. See infra text accompanying notes 269-288.
269. Goldstein & Weinberg, supra note 138, at 19.
270. Id. at 18 (citing Ex Parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 73 (1878)).
271. Id. at 19, 21.
272. Id. at 21.
273. Id. at 24.
274. Achal Oza, Note, Amend the ECPA- Fourth Amendment Protection Erodes as E-
Mails Get Dusty, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1043, 1068 (2008); Alexander Scolnik, Note, Protections for
Electronic Communications: The Stored Communications Act and the Fourth Amendment, 78
FORDHAM L. REV. 349, 397 (2009).
275. See infra text accompanying note 279 (recommending as-applied challenges rather
than facial challenges to the constitutionality of the SCA).
276. No. 1:06-cv-357, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50076, at *32 (S.D. Ohio July 21, 2006), aff'd
in part, 490 F.3d 455 (6th Cir. 2007), vacated on other grounds, 532 F.3d 521 (6th Cir. 2008).
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expect privacy in email transmitted through, or stored on, the server
of an ISP.277 However, after granting a rehearing en banc in 2008, the
court vacated the decision, holding that the constitutional claim was
not ripe. 2 7 8 In that opinion, the Sixth Circuit hinted that plaintiffs
challenging the constitutionality of the SCA should refrain from facial
attacks.279 When Warshak raised a similar claim in December 2010,
the Sixth Circuit found the claim ripe for review280 and held that a
customer has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of his
emails stored or transmitted through an ISP, and that the government
violates his Fourth Amendment rights when it compels an ISP to
disclose his emails without a warrant. 281 Of course, the court found
that the authorization of this practice in the SCA did not render it
constitutional. 282
Like Warshak, in United States v. Hart, the Western District of
Kentucky refused to decide whether compelled disclosure by
administrative subpoena was unconstitutional on its face. 2 8 3 Yet, in
contrast to Warshak, Hart subsequently rejected an email user's as-
applied challenge, 284 finding that the provider's service agreement-
allowing access of communications to comply with legal process,
provide services to the customer, and for other reasons-precluded an
inference that the user had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the
content of his emails.2 8 5
As in Hart, some commentators assert that the SCA is
constitutional. 2 8 6 Congress presumably thought so when it passed the
Act, which represents Congress's value judgment about the extent to
which individual privacy should be protected online. 287  Asking
whether a reasonable expectation of privacy exists in the place
searched "is essentially a legal fiction that masks a normative inquiry
into whether a particular law enforcement technique should be
regulated by the Fourth Amendment." 288
277. Warshak v. United States, 490 F.3d 455, 473 (6th Cir. 2007).
278. Warshak v. United States, 532 F.3d 521, 534 (6th Cir. 2008).
279. Id. at 529.
280. United States v. Warshak, No. 10-1294, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 25415, at *24 n.12
(6th Cir. Dec. 14, 2010).
281. Id. at *43.
282. Id.
283. United States v. Hart, No. 3:08-CR-00109-C, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72597, at *66
(W.D. Ky. July 28, 2009).
284. Id.
285. Id. at *68-70.
286. See Robison, supra note 189, at 1233-34.
287. Id.
288. Id. at 1233.
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Although the SCA may rightfully survive a facial challenge,
there is no principled basis for according greater privacy protections
for traditional email, as well as traditional mail, than for cloud-based
email. Certainly, the Fourth Amendment protects communications
sent through first-class mail. 2 89 Moreover, the same communication,
sent via a non-webmail email system, is protected under the SCA,
although the protection currently varies depending on the
jurisdiction.290 However, the same message, if sent through a cloud-
based email service, may lack protection under the ECS provisions, in
light of Weaver (and the interpretation of the DOJ), as well as the RCS
provisions, if not maintained solely to provide computer storage or
processing services. 291  This framework, which provides different
standards of privacy protections for the same communication, surely
contradicts users' reasonable expectations of their rights. Logically, if
a communication deserves the protection of a warrant when sent
through the mail, the same communication-even if opened and stored
by the user for 181 days-deserves the protection of a warrant when
sent through cloud-based servers.
Given that Congress conceived of the SCA as preserving the
"vitality" of the Fourth Amendment, 292 the current debate over its
constitutionality may imply that the Act no longer comports with the
Fourth Amendment. At the very least, it suggests that the SCA may
not serve the same functions Congress originally intended,293 as the
warrant requirement offers greater protection than what falls through
the cracks of the SCA.
The SCA reflects Congress's attempt to "strikeH the right
balance between the interests and needs of law enforcement and the
privacy interests of the American people."294  As the previous
discussion demonstrates, the SCA fails to serve the interests of law
enforcement, service providers, and customers. In short, the
emergence of cloud computing demonstrates that the SCA no longer
"strikes the right balance." 295
289. Ex Parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733 (1878).
290. Compare Theofel v. Farey-Jones, 359 F.3d 1066, 1075 (9th Cir. 2003) (explaining
that emails stored after transmission are maintained by an ECS provider in "electronic storage"
for backup purposes, regardless of whether the email has been opened), with DOJ SEARCH
MANUAL, supra note 131, at 123-24 (stating that opened email is not in "electronic storage").
291. See supra text accompanying notes 168-190 (discussing the Gmail example).
292. H. R. REP. No. 99-647, at 19 (1986).
293. See S. REP.. No. 99-541, at 5 (1986) ("[T]he law must advance with the technology to
ensure the continued vitality of the fourth amendment. Privacy cannot be left to depend solely on
physical protection, or it will gradually erode as technology advances.").
294. May 5 Hearings, supra note 237, at 2 (statement of Mr. Jerrold Nadler, Chairman,
Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties).
295. See supra text accompanying notes 255.
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D. Congress Should Require a Warrant to Compel Disclosure of
Communications Stored in the Cloud
Even in the absence of constitutional infirmity, the factual
basis for the distinctions in the SCA have eroded to such an extent
that Congress should amend the SCA. 2 9 6 The uneven application of
the SCA, as previously discussed, has led to considerable uncertainty
and neither reflects the realistic expectations of users of cloud
services, 297 nor the primacy email has achieved in digital-age
communications. 2 98
Congress should amend the SCA to provide clear guidance to
courts, law enforcement, businesses, and individual users. Given that
courts remain wary of deciding such technology questions, judicial
clarification is unlikely. 299 Indeed, the Supreme Court has warned
courts to treat lightly where nascent technologies impinge on privacy,
because, "[tihe judiciary risks error by elaborating too fully on the
Fourth Amendment implications of emerging technology before its role
in society has become clear." 30 0 Given the courts' recent struggles with
declaring provisions of the law unconstitutional, as in Warshak, as
well as the continuing debate over the SCA's constitutionality, there
may be little prospect for judicial resolution.301
Congress must, therefore, reform the SCA to ensure that
failing to address new technology does not undermine the balance
between individual privacy and the legitimate needs of law
296. See Gellman, supra note 19, at 12 (stating that the SCA "is a difficult law to
understand and apply, in part because the law is old and relies on a model of electronic mail and
Internet activity that is generations behind current practice and technology"); see also September
23 Hearings, supra note 12, at 32 (statement of Michael Hintze, Associate General Counsel,
Microsoft Corporation) ("[T]he basic technological assumptions upon which the [SCA] was based.
. . ha[s] not kept pace with the unprecedented digitization and storage of online data that cloud
computing has enabled.").
297. September 23 Hearings, supra note 12, at 28 (statement of Michael Hintze,
Associate General Counsel, Microsoft Corporation) (explaining that the SCA does not accord with
the realities of technology today, as the SCA has created uncertainty surrounding the privacy
protections for data stored in the cloud).
298. See, e.g., September 23 Hearings, supra note 12, at 12 (statement of Edward W.
Felten, Professor of Computer Science and Public Affairs, Princeton University) ("[E]ven more
important than changes in the [technology] have been the changes in how people use the
Internet and the role it plays in their everyday lives."); see also Gellman, supra note 19, at 7
(arguing that "[t]he law badly trails technology").
299. See, e.g., Rehberg v. Paulk, 611 F.3d 828, 846 (11th Cir. 2010). Rehberg noted that
whether an individual user has a reasonable privacy expectation in the contents of his emails
transmitted through a third-party ISP presents "complex, difficult, and 'far-reaching' legal issues
that we should be cautious about resolving too broadly." Id.
300. City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2629 (2010).
301. See Robison, supra note 189, at 1233-34 (arguing that the courts cannot declare
SCA unconstitutional).
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enforcement. 302 While previous commentators have suggested that
Congress eliminate the 180-day rule for providers of ECS,303 Congress
should first consider whether the distinction between ECS and RCS
even makes sense. As discussed previously, the distinction between
the two types of services is no longer practical, and cloud provider may
be characterized as providing either ECS or RCS.30 4
In amending the SCA, Congress should adopt the following
three reforms. First, Congress should eliminate the distinction
between ECS and RCS and subject the content of all communications
stored electronically to the warrant requirement. Exceptions may be
made, however, for communications the government can show were
"abandoned" by the user, or where the user cannot establish that he
had an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the
communication. Second, Congress should clarify that both opened and
unopened emails as well as other electronic communications are
protected against compelled government disclosure without a warrant.
Finally, Congress should discard the 180-day rule and subject all
communications stored electronically to the warrant requirement,
regardless of how long they remain in the cloud. Congress should
consider the following statutory language:
A governmental entity may only require a provider of communications services to
disclose the contents of a wire or electronic communication, if transmitted or stored
electronically, only upon the issuance of a warrant by a court of competent jurisdiction,
whether or not the provider stores the communication after receipt by the user, and
regardless of whether the communication remains on the server after receipt or is
downloaded to the user's device.
In implementing these reforms, Congress should respect the
principle of technology neutrality, which would ensure each electronic
communication receives the same protection, regardless of the
particular technology creating, transmitting, or storing that
communication. 30 5 Furthermore, Congress must continue to monitor
new technologies, which may undermine the legislative purpose of the
SCA. Congress should ensure that the law is responsive to new
technologies by committing to periodically reassess the continued
vitality of the Act.
This approach has the advantages of providing law
enforcement, users, and service providers with a consistent standard
for compelled disclosure of electronic communications. The warrant
302. See S. REP. No. 99-541, pt. 3, at 5 (1986).
303. Oza, supra note 274, at 1070.
304. See supra text accompanying notes 168-190. The Gmail example demonstrates the
complexity of the various approaches. See supra text accompanying notes 168-190.
305. September 23 Hearings, supra note 12, at 52 (statement of David Schellhase,
Executive Vice President and General Counsel, Salesforce.com).
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requirement will better comport with the reasonable expectations of
users and bring privacy in the cloud more in line with the privacy
afforded traditional mail under Ex Parte Jackson.306 Amending the
SCA will also preserve the incentives for businesses and users to shift
to more innovative and efficient computing models, without fear of
losing privacy protections in the process. Congress should act swiftly
to update the existing law, which will only become more antiquated as
technology advances.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Stored Communications Act (SCA) must be updated in
order to accommodate the tremendous technological advances of the
last twenty-five years.307 Congress enacted the SCA to ensure that the
method of communication did not compromise the privacy of the
message.308 While Congress-in 1986-touted the SCA as affording
privacy protections to new technologies that were not addressed by
then-existing law, 30 9 it has yet to reconsider the Act's structural
framework. 310
Unfortunately, the law has not proven flexible enough to
protect communications enabled by new technologies, and it remains
unclear whether the SCA even extends to communications stored in
the cloud. 311 The distinction between an ECS and an RCS no longer
makes sense, yet the characterization of a particular service has
significant implications for the user's privacy in the communication. 3 1 2
Likewise, the 180-day rule no longer conforms to the practical realities
of email storage or the expectations of email users.313  Congress
306. See 96 U.S. 727, 733 (1878).
307. See Crispin v. Christian Audigier, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 2d 965, 972 n.15 (C.D. Cal.
2010) (citing William Jeremy Robison, Note, Free at What Cost?: Cloud Computing Privacy
Under the Stored Communications Act, 98 GEO. L.J. 1195, 1198 (2010)) (noting that the World
Wide Web was introduced in 1990 and web browser introduced in 1994).
308. S. REP. NO. 99-541, pt. 3, at 5 (1986) ("[Tjhe law must advance with the technology
to ensure the continued vitality of the fourth amendment. Privacy cannot be left to depend solely
on physical protection, or it will gradually erode as technology advances.").
309. S. REP. No. 99-541, pt. 1, at 1 (1986).
310. About the Issue, supra note 232.
311. See also supra text accompanying notes 168-190 (demonstrating that the Gmail
example shows cloud-based email may be outside the scope of the SCA). See generally Gellman,
supra note 19, at 12-13 (discussing the uncertainty as to the applicability of the SCA to cloud
computing).
312. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a) (2006) (requiring warrant to compel ECS providers to
disclose communications in "electronic storage" for 180 days or less and describing the tripartite
standard that applies to compel RCS providers).
313. May 5 Hearings, supra note 237, at 74 (statement of J. Beckwith Burr, Partner,
Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale & Dorr, LLP); see supra notes 209-213 (describing how the 180-
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should, therefore, amend the SCA to ensure that all communications
stored in the cloud are subject to the warrant requirement.
Ilana R. Kattan*
day rule reflected the short duration of storage in 1986, while users today typically save their
most important emails for longer periods of time).
J.D. Candidate, Vanderbilt University Law School, 2012; B.A., Sociology, Vanderbilt
University, 2009. The author wishes to thank her parents for their support during her academic
career. In addition, the author wishes to thank the editorial staff of the VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF
ENTERTAINMENT AND TECHNOLOGY LAW, especially Nathan McGregor, Kevin Lumpkin, and
Emily Beverage, for wonderful editing and thoughtful suggestions during the preparation of this
Note. Finally, the author wishes to thank Daniel Gervais, Professor of Law, Co-Director,
Technology & Entertainment Law Program at Vanderbilt University Law School for his input on
this Note.
[Vol. 13:3:617656
